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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Ronald Stanley Favini appeals his sentence after he was convicted by a jury of
aggravated battery, and found to be a persistent violator by the district court.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Favini was charged with aggravated battery, with deadly weapon and persistent
violator enhancements, for inflicting a knife wound on Jeremy George (R., pp.32-34)
during an early morning dispute between the two men at a bar (PSI, p.i). Favini was
convicted of aggravated battery after a jury trial, and was found by the district court to
be a persistent violator. (R., pp.133-134; Tr., p.265, L.1 - p. 266, L.14; p.267, L.17 - p.
274, L.1.) A mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2524 was requested by Favini
and ordered by the court.

(Tr., p.275, L.13 - p.276, L.24.)

Prior to the sentencing

hearing, Favini's trial counsel filed a motion for Favini to undergo a competency
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211 (R., p.138), which was granted (R., p.142). The
district court sentenced Favini to a unified 50-year term with 15 years fixed and retained
jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.149-151.)
After the Department of Correction recommended early termination of Favini's
rider period, the district court held a hearing in which it relinquished jurisdiction over
Favini and modified his sentence to fifty years unified, with five years fixed. (4/13/12
Addendum to PSI, 5/9/12 Ret. Juris. Dispo. (Augmentations).)

Favini filed a timely

notice of appeal. (Notice of Appeal, 8/23/11, Supreme Court No. 39123.)

1

All citations to the PSI are to the electronic file "Sealed RONALD STANLEY FAVINI
DONE.pdf."
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination when it improperly used information
obtained for purposes of determining Mr. Favini's competency,
during the jurisdictional review hearing?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1.
Has Favini failed to demonstrate fundamental error in the district court's
consideration of his competency evaluation at sentencing?
2. Has Favini failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Favini Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error In The District Court's
Consideration Of His Competency Evaluation At Sentencing

A.

Introduction
Favini claims "that the district court improperly considered the conclusions

contained within his competency evaluation, which were based in part on statements
that he made during the competency evaluation, as an aggravating circumstance when
determining Mr. Favini's sentence during the jurisdictional review hearing." (Appellant's
Brief, pp.5-8.) This argument fails because the issue was not preserved by objection
and Favini has not shown that the asserted error is fundamental.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether the issue was preserved is
a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct.
App. 1989). Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review
an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires
Favini to demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245
P.3d at 980.
3

C.

Favini Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error From The District Court's
Consideration Of Dr. Parkman's Competency Evaluation
Favini did not object, either at sentencing or at the jurisdictional review hearing,

to the district court's consideration of the competency evaluation prepared by Dr.
Parkman.

(See generally Tr., pp.286-308; 5/9/12 Tr., pp.3-33.)

On appeal, Favini

claims it was fundamental error for the district court to consider Dr. Parkman's
evaluation when determining Favini's sentence during the jurisdictional review hearing.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Because this issue has not been shown to be fundamental
error, it may not be properly considered on appeal.
The first prong of the fundamental error test is that Favini must demonstrate the
error is constitutional, and not merely a violation of a statute or rule. Perry, 150 Idaho at
228, 245 P.3d at 980. The record does not support Favini's claim of a constitutional
violation.

Favini argues that, "generally speaking[,] neither statements made by an

accused during a competency evaluation, nor psychiatric opinions derived therefore
[sic], may be admitted against a defendant for sentencing purposes, unless the
defendant was advised of the right against self-incrimination and waived that right."
(Appellant's Brief, p.6 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469 (1981), and State v.
Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 229 P.3d 1179 (Ct. App. 2010).) This argument fails for
several reasons.
First, because the Jockumsen decision, cited by Favini, predates the Perry
decision, the court did not apply the three-part fundamental error test currently required
to show fundamental error. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 820, 229 P.3d at 1182.2 Second,

2

Favini does not cite Jockumsen for the proposition that the error he claims is
fundamental. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.5-8.)
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in its constitutional analysis, the Jockumsen Court, citing Buchanan v. Kentucky. 483
U.S. 402 (1987), stated that an unwarned competency evaluation may still be used at
sentencing where the defense presents mental health evidence, and explained:
An exception to this rule of the exclusion of statements made in
competency evaluations can arise if the defendant introduces mental
health evidence as a defense at trial or in mitigation at sentencing. The
Supreme Court addressed this situation in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483
U.S. 402, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), where the prosecutor
and defense counsel had jointly moved the Court to order an evaluation of
the defendant pursuant to a statute governing involuntary hospitalization
for psychiatric treatment. ...
In this case, Jockumsen's competency evaluations were attached
to the PSI and also were used by Dr. Perrien in formulating her report to
the court. The district court used against Jockumsen statements that he
made in the competency evaluations as the court determined whether
Jockumsen's mental illness should be a mitigating factor in sentencing and
whether he had taken responsibility for his actions. The court also used
the evaluations adversely in making its decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
Neither party here contends that Jockumsen was properly advised of his
Fifth Amendment rights or warned that his statements could be used
against him before he submitted to the competency evaluations, or that he
thereafter knowingly waived those rights to enable the district court to
consider the competency evaluations at sentencing.
Neither did
Jockumsen implicitly waive or forfeit his Fifth Amendment rights as
occurred in Buchanan and Powell [v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989)], for
Jockumsen did not introduce mental health evidence at the sentencing
hearing and thereby entitle the prosecution to use the competency
evaluations as rebuttal evidence. Rather, the competency evaluations
were improperly placed before the court as attachments to the PSI. It thus
appears that Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment privilege was violated in the
same manner as occurred in Estelle.
Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 820-21, 229 P.3d at 1182-83 (emphasis added).

Here, in

direct contrast to the situation in Jockumsen, the defense did request the inclusion of
mental health evidence at the sentencing hearing by asking that Favini undergo a
mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2524.

(Tr., p.275, L.11 - p.276, L.3.)

Therefore, under the standard applied in Buchanan and Jockumsen, there was no

5

constitutional violation.

The record affirmatively disproves the first element of a

fundamental error claim.
The record also affirmatively disproves the second element of a fundamental
error claim. Rather than merely showing no need for additional evidence on whether
the lack of objection to consideration of the competency evaluation was the result of
tactical choice, the record shows that the defense wanted information about Favini's
mental health to be considered at sentencing. The defense requested both a mental
health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, and a competency evaluation under LC. §
18-211, prior to sentencing.

(R., pp.135-138; Tr., p.275, L.11 - p.276, L.24.)

The

competency evaluation by Dr. Parkman was made a part of the PSI, and at sentencing,
Favini said he had read the evaluation and did not voice any objection to its contents or
its consideration.

(Tr., p.286, L.2 - p.287, L.5.)

Because the defense requested a

mental health evaluation be done pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 for sentencing purposes,
the record suggests that the lack of an objection to consideration of the competency
evaluation may have been tactical. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80
(Ct. App. 2000) (party may not claim as error on appeal any ruling it invited, consented
to, or acquiesced in).
Finally the record shows no prejudice.

Favini bears the burden of showing

prejudice. At the jurisdictional review hearing, after announcing its sentencing decision,
the district court considered Favini's diagnosis from his I.C. § 19-2524 mental health
evaluation of "malingering and an antisocial personality disorder, in addition to [his]
alcohol dependence and
dependence[.]"

[his] cocaine dependence and

(5/9/12 Tr., p.18, Ls. 3-8;
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. . . amphetamine

PSI, pp.72-78.)

After making that

observation, the district court mentioned Dr. Parkman's competency evaluation of
Favini, stating:
A couple months later, June 13th , 2011, Dr. Parkman, a psychologist,
diagnosed you essentially similarly with personality disorder, not otherwise
specified, with marked borderline, schizotypal and antisocial features in
addition to your poly-substance dependence, generalized anxiety disorder,
mood disorder, and then - I think that was the extent of the mental health
evaluations .
. . . But, again, I have nothing to indicate that you have a mental
health problem, and even if I did, there is nothing to connect any mental
health problem with your consistent antisocial conduct, so that's the
reason for my decision.
(5/9/12 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-23.)
The district court concluded that Favini's criminality did not arise from any mental
illness, but, instead, resulted from his antisocial and borderline personality traits.
(5/9/12Tr., p.15, L.23-p.16, L.8; p.17, L.7-p.18, L.23.) Asthedistrictcourtexplained
to Favini, "You have been given several mental health evaluations, and none of them
show any mental illness that would explain your conduct." (5/9/12 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-3.)
Because the court ultimately concluded that Favini's criminal behavior did not stem from
mental illness, there is no basis in the record to believe that his sentence would have
been different if the competency evaluation had not been considered by the court.
Favini has failed to show from the record any of the three prongs required by
Perry for a successful fundamental error claim.
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11.
Favini Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Favini asserts "his unified sentence of fifty years, with five years fixed, is

excessive in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case." (Appellant's Brief,
p.9.) However, Favini has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in its sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal the appellate court

conducts an independent review of the record that considers the nature of the offense,
the defendant's character and protection of society. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,
772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). "Absent a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion, a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal." State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,604,768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).

C.

Favini Has Failed To Establish That His Sentence Is Excessive In Light Of The
Mitigating Factors
Favini's conviction for aggravated battery is based upon the following trial

testimony: One evening in November, 2010, Jeremy George and a co-worker, Cheryle
Hamilton, went to a Coeur d'Alene bar for drinks, and afterwards, waited outside for a
cab. 3 (Tr., p.141, Ls.8-13; p.159, Ls.2-16.) Mr. George was in a leg cast and used
crutches due to having a broken ankle. (Tr., p.139, L.8 - p.140, L.2.) Kathy Maciosek,
a bartender at the bar, went outside to smoke a cigarette and noticed that Favini was
3

Mr. George did not have a clear recollection of the events that took place due to the
amount of alcohol he had consumed that evening. (Tr., p.141, Ls.1-4.)
8

hassling the man on crutches (Mr. George), so she asked Favini to leave him alone.
(Tr., p.124, L.7-p.125, L.8.) Favini kept on harassing "the victim on the crutches," so
"some security gentlemen" and others "just kept telling him to leave them alone[,]" and
in Ms. Maciosek's words:
... all of a sudden I noticed that ... I observed the victim grab - the
defendant approached the victim, and the victim grabbed down and
grabbed a knife.
(Tr., p.125, L. 19 - p.126, L.8.)
According to other witnesses, during the dispute, Favini pushed Mr. George on
his shoulders and pulled out a pocketknife. 4 (Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23; p.183, L.11 - p.184,
L.1.) Favini then lunged at Mr. George's abdomen in an apparent attempt to stab him
there, but was prevented from doing so by Mr. George, who used one of his hands to
protect himself by deflecting the knife - receiving a cut to his hand in the process. (Tr.,
p.127, L.25-p.128, L.16; p.142, L.15-p.144, L.8; p.185, L.9-p.187, L.4.) One of the
bar patrons, Tim Beach, saw Favini with his hands in his pocket, and then heard a
woman say "he has a knife," and when he looked over, he saw Favini's arm extended
and Mr. George holding one of his hands. (Tr., p.185, Ls.2-11.) When Mr. Beach saw
that there was a lot of blood, he thought it might have come from Mr. George's stomach.
(Tr., p.186, L.17 - p.187, L.4.) Mr. Beach and others present at the bar immediately
detained Favini.

(Tr., p.130, Ls.15-21; p.187, Ls.6-22.) Coeur d'Alene Police Officer

Spencer Mortensen was called to the scene and arrested Favini.

(Tr., p.167, L.3 -

p.168, L.13.) Mr. George received eight stitches to his hand from an emergency room

4

Tim Beach testified that, although he never saw Mr. George push Favini during the
incident, Mr. George "might have fallen" into Favini at some point. (Tr., p.185, Ls.1521.)
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physician, and testified that the knife wound cut the web area of his hand which caused
him to lose some feeling and dexterity to that area. (Tr., p.144, Ls.4-8; p.145, L.14 p.147, L.7.)
To determine whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, an
appellate court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case,"
including the record, and considers the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail,
the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence
is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. State v. Stover, 140
Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are "(1) protection of

society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Cross, 132
Idaho 667,671, 978 P.2d 227,231 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
Favini's 50-year sentence with five years fixed is within the statutory limits for
aggravated battery with a persistent violator enhancement. I.C. §§ 18-908, 19-2514.
Favini does not contend his sentence falls outside of the statutory limits. Instead, he
asserts the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in light of his "long history of
mental illness and his desire for treatment, as well as his genuine remorse for having
committed the crime[.]" (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.)
Although Favini's arguments may have some relevancy to sentencing, a
sentencing court is not required to assess or balance all of the sentencing goals in an
equal manner. State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663, 665 (Ct. App.
1993). "As a matter of policy in Idaho, the primary consideration is the good order and
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protection of society.

All other factors must be subservient to that end."

State v.

Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627, 873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994) (citing State v. Moore, 78 Idaho
359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)).
Contrary to Favini's claim to being mentally ill, the mental health examination
report, conducted prior to Favini's sentencing hearing at his request pursuant to LC. §
19-2524, concluded he was not mentally ill, but was "over-reporting his mental health
problems, which suggests the presence of malingering." (PSI, pp.77-78.) That report
summarized the findings of a variety of mental health facilities from 1999 to the present,
with only one of the facilities having diagnosed Favini with a mental illness; in 2007,
Sacred Heart Medical Center made a discharge diagnosis of "paranoid psychosis
Schizophreniform," but the records did not elaborate on that condition.

(Id., p.76.)

Rather than that one diagnosis being correct while all the other diagnoses were wrong,
it is possible Favini was malingering and "over-reporting" his mental condition at that
time (2007), just as he did during his § 19-2524 mental health evaluation prior to
sentencing in this case. The district court found that it had been presented no indication
that Favini suffered from a mental illness. (5/9/12 Tr., p.15 - p.18, L.23.) Favini has
failed to show clear error in the district court's determination that he did not demonstrate
any mental illness at the time of his current offense which warranted mitigation of his
sentence.
Although Favini claimed to have remorse for his crime during his presentence
interview (see PSI, p.20), a sentencing court is not bound by a defendant's statement of
remorse, "but may discount its credibility and impact on sentencing." State v. Hoffman,
123 Idaho 638, 648, 851 P.2d 934, 944 (1993); State v. Kerrigan, 123 Idaho 508, 513,
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849 P.2d 969, 974 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, the district court was not required to accept
Favini's statement of remorse as a reason to impose a lesser sentence. Moreover, the
fact that the victim, Mr. George, stated that he had no ill will towards Favini, but wanted
him punished "in some way" (PSI, p.3), is not a basis for a more lenient sentence.
Favini has failed to show that his sentence is excessive, particularly in light of the
nature of his offense, his extensive history of criminal offending and substance abuse,
and his failure to rehabilitate. Favini's offense is serious and violent. Had it not been for
Mr. George's quick defensive reaction to seeing Favini lunge at him with a knife, the
severity of his injuries could have been much worse. Favini's argument that the district
court "sentenced [him] for up to more than 6 years in prison per stitch" (Appellant's
Brief, p.11) attempts to trivialize the serious nature of his crime, and ignores the fact that
he plainly tried to stab Mr. George in the torso or stomach, but was prevented from
doing so only by Mr. George's own defensive act of deflecting the knife with his hand.
Favini's criminal record, as summarized in the PSI, is nothing short of
remarkable:
Now age 41, defendant's criminal history begins at age 17 (1987) with a
King County (WA) juvenile burglary conviction. Not including the instant
case, defendant [sic] criminal history reflects 37 charges, spans 23 years,
and has resulted in not less than 25 convictions. Represented are 20
felony charges (15 convictions/5 dismissals and/or charges declined); 12
misdemeanors (9 convictions/3 dismissals); 1 each a conviction and
dismissal for offenses unclassified by severity; and 5 charges (2 felonies/3
misdemeanors) without dispositions reported.
The plurality of
defendant's charge history - felony and misdemeanors at 13 - are
primarily domestic crimes and assault (many violations of domestic
violence court orders). His domestic crime convictions have twice resulted
in prison sentences (2003 & 2005), time imprisoned in both cases <2Y.
His 24 other charges reflect (in approximate frequency) thefts/property
crimes, drug (mostly felonies) and alcohol related offenses. First record of
a charge drug-related in defendant's criminal history occurred in 2002 (a
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felony charge dismissed); alcohol in 1990 (age 20/convicted of two
misdemeanors).
(PSI, p.9.) When the district court sentenced Favini to a rider, it recognized the danger
he posed to society based on his criminal record and past failure to be rehabilitated, but
gave him one last opportunity to prove he could abide by society's rules, explaining:
The public needs to be protected from you. I feel that way because
of your prior record, because of the level of your intoxication on the day in
question, because of the fact that you were on probation when you
committed this offense, and the fact that you had a knife with you. That
tells me that you don't care about any judge's order. You don't care at all
about society's laws. You don't care at all about managing your mental
health because you're out drinking to this extent, and you can't manage
your mental health when you're drinking to this extent, and you care not a
bit about your addictions and your abuse, so I don't know that I've ever
done this in the last ten years as a judge, but I find you completely lacking
in your ability to operate in society in a safe manner, anywhere remotely
safe manner.
You've got this one opportunity to try and deal with those three
main issues: Your antisocial personality, your mental health problem, and
your drug and alcohol problem, and if you can impress me a year from
now that you successfully did that, then I'll consider probation, and if you
can't convince me of that, if you do poorly on this rider and let me down in
any one of those three areas, then I won't hesitate to have you serve your
sentence which means the rest of your life in prison.
(Tr., p.306, L.6 - p.307, L.5.)
While on his rider, Favini proved that he was completely unfit for probation. The
recommendation by the Department of Correction stated:
While at North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI), Mr. Favini
demonstrated himself as a disciplinary concern. He repeatedly challenged
and threatened other offenders, creating chaos and some anxiety in his
housing unit. Mr. Favini either failed or refused to demonstrate behavior
that would suggest that he would be able to successfully follow the
requirements of probation. It is a serious concern that Mr. Favini has not
been willing (or possibly able) to follow the rules and guidelines and
refuses to accept accountability for his actions - both at NICI and in the
community. Many efforts have been made to accommodate any special
needs that Mr. Favini might have; however, his recent Cardinal Rule
13

violations require that he be removed from NICI to reduce threats to
institutional security and safety. His behaviors have also created a great
deal of chaos in the family. Mr. Favini has not responded to multiple staff
interventions and does not appear interested in correcting his behavior.
Due to these behaviors, he remains at a higher risk for reoffending within
the community.
Mr. Favini's institutional performance, program
participation, and central file have been repeatedly reviewed by multiple
staff members, in several committee settings, to attempt to accommodate
Mr. Favini and to determine his overall amenability toward completing the
TC program at NICI and to his suitability for community-based supervision.
Additionally, Mr. Favini claims that all of his negative behavior has been
caused by a combination of a seizure disorder and mental health issues
and NICI does not have the expertise that is necessary to determine the
validity of this. After final review it was determined that due to Mr. Favini's
inappropriate actions and behaviors and the risk he has created, a
recommendation for Relinquish Jurisdiction is being submitted to the
court.
(4/13/12 Addendum to PSI, 5/9/12 Ret. Juris. Dispo., pp.5-6 (Augmentations).)
At the jurisdictional review hearing, the district court recognized that Favini failed
miserably in his rider opportunity. (5/9/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.18-24.) The court summarized
Favini's criminal history, and reaffirmed that "there is nothing to connect any mental
health problem with [his] consistent antisocial conduct[.]" (5/9/12 Tr., p.17, L.7 - p.18,
L.23.) The court recognized that Favini continued to pose a danger to society:
It's not clear to me that you have any sort of mental illness, and it is quite
clear to me that even if you do have some sort of mental illness, you have
almost intractable, maybe not correctable, antisocial personality, and if
that is the case, then society needs to be protected from you as long as
possible.
If you're not able to conform your conduct in the penitentiary, then I
have every confidence in the State of Idaho Commission of Pardons and
Parole that they will keep you there beyond the five-year fixed portion of
your sentence. I think your only hope for getting out at the end of your five
years when you're parole-eligible is to, number one, behave and, number
two, take whatever programming you can to convince the parole
commission that you are a good candidate for parole.
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(5/9/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-17.)

See Moore, 78 Idaho at 363, 304 P.2d at 1103 (the

protection of society is, and must always be, the ultimate goal of any sentence).
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a
reasonable sentence. The sentence imposed is appropriate in light of Favini's steadfast
criminal behavior and substance abuse, and his failure to rehabilitate despite having
been granted numerous opportunities to do so. Given any reasonable view of the facts,
Favini has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Favini's conviction and sentence.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2012.
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